This paper empirically investigates one aspect of the folk concept of time by testing how the presence or absence of directedness impacts judgements about whether there is time in a world. Experiment 1 found that dynamists, showed significantly higher levels of agreement that there is time in dynamically directed worlds than in non-dynamical non-directed worlds. Comparing our results to those we describe in Latham et al., we report that while ~ 70% of dynamists say there is time in B-theory worlds, (...) only ~ 45% say there is time in C-theory worlds. Thus, while the presence of directedness makes dynamists more inclined to say there is time in a world, a substantial subpopulation of dynamists judge that there is time in non-directed worlds. By contrast, a majority of non-dynamists judged that there was time in both growing block worlds and C-theory worlds, with no significant differences between the means. Experiment 2 found that when participants are only presented with non-dynamical worlds—namely, a directed world and a non-directed world—they report significantly higher levels of agreement that there is time in B-theory worlds. However, the majority of participants still judge that there is time in C-theory worlds. We conclude that while the presence of directedness bolsters judgements that there is time, most people do not judge it to be necessary for time. (shrink)

While artificial intelligence has the potential to process vast amounts of data, generate new insights, and unlock greater productivity, its widespread adoption may entail unforeseen consequences. We identify conditions under which AI, by reducing the cost of access to certain modes of knowledge, can paradoxically harm public understanding. While large language models are trained on vast amounts of diverse data, they naturally generate output towards the ‘center’ of the distribution. This is generally useful, but widespread reliance on recursive AI systems (...) could lead to a process we define as “knowledge collapse”, and argue this could harm innovation and the richness of human understanding and culture. However, unlike AI models that cannot choose what data they are trained on, humans may strategically seek out diverse forms of knowledge if they perceive them to be worthwhile. To investigate this, we provide a simple model in which a community of learners or innovators choose to use traditional methods or to rely on a discounted AI-assisted process and identify conditions under which knowledge collapse occurs. In our default model, a 20% discount on AI-generated content generates public beliefs 2.3 times further from the truth than when there is no discount. An empirical approach to measuring the distribution of LLM outputs is provided in theoretical terms and illustrated through a specific example comparing the diversity of outputs across different models and prompting styles. Finally, we consider further research directions to counteract harmful outcomes. (shrink)

Ushenko's speculative vision opened on the problem of time and its relation to logic. Profoundly concerned about the theme of time--the theme that intrinsically defines romantic irrationalism--he yet endeavored to vindicate within the bounds of temporality the sovereignty of logic so essential to the continuance of classical philosophy. The dual preoccupation with time and logic urged him into the fields of symbolic logic and relativity physics. From the flux of unrepeatable events he disengaged the laws of logic and the propositions (...) of scientific discourse, while at the same time he sought to keep both orders of entity united without injury to either. He ventured into nature as disclosed by contemporary physics and selected the category of event to supplant substance. He undertook to expound a metaphysics of events, grappled with the problem of the unity not only of nature but of the singular events that make up nature, and fixed upon the overarching structure of the space-time of relativity physics to resolve the problem. But this did not suffice. The metaphysical vision at work in these early books glimpsed at moments a principle beyond time, beyond propositions, beyond events--the principle of power. Power and Events: An Essay on Dynamics in Philosophy focused on the principle of power, integrating the other themes in terms of it. As the mature work of a significant and original thinker, Power and Events posed the principle of power as the central idea for the future course of philosophical investigation. In pursuit of its implications Ushenko embarked upon the philosophy of art in his last book Dynamics of Art and in a consistent yet startling fashion advanced the thesis that the substance of art is in effect a dynamic equilibrium of powers. (shrink)

Introduction: Philosophy in Spite of Itself Aristotle defines man as the political and rational animal, but the readings in this book are guided by his ...

In recent debates on digital twins, much attention has been paid to understanding the interaction between individuals and their digital representations (Braun, 2021). Iglesias et al. (2025) shed ne...

Murayama and Jach offer a thoughtful and timely critique of motivation constructs. We largely concur with their basic premises, but offer additional input and clarification regarding the importance of carefully considering the energization and direction components of motivation, and fully attending to the hierarchical aspect of motivation rather than prioritizing particular levels of analysis.

Stressing the immediacy of Being, Hegel placed it categorially first in his logic. But the immediacy of Being, its presence no matter which content or lack of content be presented, signals a purity which ironically deprives it of every specific reality. Hence Hegel emphasized that Being, immediate and pure, is vacuous and collapses into Nothing. Extending a philosophical argument derived from Parmenides and Plato, Hegel further inferred Becoming from the dialectic of Being and Nothing, as though with static concepts he (...) could create the concrete flux. (shrink)

Boodin's theory of knowledge was but a moment in an unfolding metaphysical system. Although Truth and Reality began with a plea for the toleration of different metaphysical interpretations, on the ground that each system is the result of the peculiar perspective afforded by the temperament of the particular philosopher, Boodin nevertheless promised in the "preface" to publish a metaphysics, entitled A Realistic Universe. This book was a bold philosophical adventure, because it claimed nothing less than the application of pragmatic method (...) to the task of constructing a metaphysical system. By this Boodin meant "... that we must judge the nature of reality, in its various grades and complexities, by the consequences to the realization of human purposes, instead of by a priori assumptions". "The only key we have to reality is what reality must be taken as in the progressive realization of the purposes of human nature". The synoptic vision afforded by metaphysics, inextricably linked to a conception of reality as that with which human purposes must cope, is moreover grounded in the procedures and results of the empirical sciences. "Whenever philosophy has been vital," Boodin wrote in the "Introduction" to the first edition of A Realistic Universe, "it has always followed close upon the heels of science and human interest.". (shrink)

This volume consists of two lecture series given by Heidegger in the 1940s and 1950s. The lectures given in Bremen constitute the first public lectures Heidegger delivered after World War II, when he was officially banned from teaching. Here, Heidegger openly resumes thinking that deeply engaged him with Hölderlin's poetry and themes developed in his earlier works. In the Freiburg lectures Heidegger ponders thought itself and freely engages with the German idealists and Greek thinkers who had provoked him in the (...) past. Andrew J. Mitchell's translation allows English-speaking readers to explore important connections with Heidegger's earlier works on language, logic, and reality. (shrink)

MICHAEL KAMMEN in his book, A Machine That Would Go of Itself, has provided a comprehensive but highly readable history of the role of the Constitution in American culture. He has commented, with notable insight, on the capacity of Americans "to view their Constitution with a vision that was occasionally clouded and frequently bifocal: bifocal in the sense that the Constitution as a cultural symbol, rationalized in various ways, could be seen on a separate plane--or literally through a discrete lens--from (...) the Constitution as a 'practical system.' " While Kammen has devoted much detailed attention to "that discrepancy between the applied Constitution and the symbolic constitution," the bulk of his large book centers on the role of the Constitution as cultural icon. In this paper I shall explore what the Constitution as icon represents, although I shall also attend to some critical facets of the Constitution as a practical system. What the Constitution symbolizes has been a major moral and intellectual strand threading together the fabric of Western civilization from antiquity to the present. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage est une réédition numérique d’un livre paru au XXe siècle, désormais indisponible dans son format d’origine.

Many manipulation arguments against compatibilism rely on the claim that manipulation is relevantly similar to determinism. But we argue that manipulation is nothing like determinism in one relevant respect. Determinism is a "universal" phenomenon: its scope includes every feature of the universe. But manipulation arguments feature cases where an agent is the only manipulated individual in her universe. Call manipulation whose scope includes at least one but not all agents "existential manipulation." Our responsibility practices are impacted in different ways by (...) universal and existential phenomena. And this is a relevant difference, especially on Strawsonian approaches to moral responsibility, which take facts about our responsibility practices to be deeply connected to the nature of responsibility itself. We argue that Strawsonian accounts of moral responsibility are immune to manipulation arguments, and no attempt to modify the scope of manipulation or determinism featured in these arguments will help incompatibilists secure their desired conclusion. (shrink)

REASON AND REVOLUTION, to which Henry F. May has called attention in his noteworthy book, The Enlightenment in America, mentioned in the first article in the present series, marks the period of American colonial history from 1763 to 1776. The Declaration of Independence, I have maintained, is a consummate expression of these Enlightenment features, influenced by the thought of John Locke and others in philosophy. From cautious moderation the American movement of protest against British rule climaxed in a revolution. The (...) dynamic structure of the epoch unfolded as a kind of sorites, of which the major premises are a general philosophy of rights and a particular theory of the British Empire, the minor premises are numerous allegedly factual violations of these theoretical premises, and the conclusion is a decisive act of separation or independence. Since, however, the Enlightenment mode of revolution rested, to reiterate May's statement, on "the belief in the possibility of constructing a new heaven and earth out of the destruction of the old," the moment in history expressed by the Declaration of Independence logically leads to other moments, one of which is the formation of the American republic as both a federal and national union. This singular moment is crystallized in the Constitution of the United States, a document equal in importance to the Declaration of Independence as a symbol of the Enlightenment. (shrink)

REASON, SKEPTICISM, REVOLUTION, AND COMMON SENSE--these are the four characteristics which Henry F. May has found to designate the four categories, or stages, in the development of the Enlightenment in Europe and America. These categories, useful for the classification, description, and analysis of the copious intellectual and cultural materials which comprise the Enlightenment, overlap in the formulation of basic documents--the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution of the United States, and the Bill of Rights, which are fundamental American laws. The interweaving (...) of reason and revolution in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States has been examined by direct references to the European philosophers whose ideas were employed, with modifications, and implemented by means of newly invented institutions on the part of the American founders. The ideas of Locke, Montesquieu, Burlamaqui, Hutcheson, Hume, and many other thinkers, became instruments of political change in the hands of the Americans. Revolution, moderated by reason and common sense, led to constitution, in order to secure the gains of revolution. (shrink)

THE ENLIGHTENMENT IS DISTINGUISHED from other periods of history by two major characteristics: 1) the widespread belief that it was superior morally and intellectually to all those periods which preceded it, and 2) the conviction that human faculties, reason or moral sense, are primarily responsible for this achievement. The Enlightenment was marked, furthermore, by radical change in the organization of society and by rapid progress in the applications of scientific technology to the production of goods and services. Since political and (...) ecclesiastical authorities were challenged during the Enlightenment, revolutions, both democratic and industrial, have been its fruit. Inherited traditions and established institutions were often overthrown or overhauled in order to release the human energies, ideas, and values which promoted the erection of new institutions. (shrink)

Part Two of Ordo VI of the Amsterdam edition of Erasmi opera omnia presents his Greek text and his Latin translation of the Gospel according to St. John and the Acts of the Apostles.

One debate surrounding Derk Pereboom’s (2001, 2014) four-case argument against compatibilism focuses on whether, and why, we judge manipulated agents to be neither free nor morally responsible. In this paper, we propose a novel explanation. The four-case argument features cases where an agent is the only individual in her universe who has been manipulated. Let us call manipulation whose scope includes at least one but not all agents existential manipulation. Contrast this with universal manipulation, which affects all agents within a (...) universe. We propose that we find agents in Pereboom’s manipulation cases less free and morally responsible in part because they are the target of existential manipulation. We empirically tested this hypothesis and found that people’s free will and moral responsibility judgments were sensitive to the scope of manipulation: people judged existentially manipulated agents significantly less free and responsible than universally manipulated agents. (shrink)

THE REVIVAL OF ONTOLOGY, the study of being, is a conspicuous feature of the present philosophical scene. Analytic philosophers and phenomenological researchers concur in admitting the validity of ontological questions, although they disagree about the manner in which these questions may be expressed and answered. Few philosophers in ancient or modern times have matched Paul Weiss in the field of ontology, and I esteem it a privilege, for which I wish to state my thanks, to have been invited here to (...) participate in this symposium in Weiss's honor and to have as my topic for discussion his concept of being. (shrink)

It has widely been assumed, by philosophers, that most people unambiguously have a phenomenology as of time passing, and that this is a datum that philosophical theories must accommodate. Moreover, it has been assumed that the greater the extent to which people have said phenomenology, the more likely they are to endorse a dynamical theory of time. This paper is the first to empirically test these assumptions. Surprisingly, our results do not support either assumption. One experiment instead found the reverse (...) correlation: people were more likely to report having passage phenomenology if they endorsed a non-dynamical theory of time. Given that people do not have an unambiguous phenomenology as of time passing, we conclude that this is suggestive evidence in favor of veridical non-dynamism—the view that our phenomenology is veridical, and that it does not unambiguously represent that time passes. Instead, our phenomenology veridically has some quite different content. (shrink)

Recent research (Latham, Miller and Norton, forthcoming) reveals that a majority of people represent actual time as dynamical. But do they, as suggested by McTaggart and Gödel, represent time as essentially dynamical? This paper distinguishes three interrelated questions. We ask (a) whether the folk representation of time is sensitive or insensitive: i.e., does what satisfies the folk representation of time in counterfactual worlds depend on what satisfies it actually—sensitive—or does is not depend on what satisfies it actually—insensitive, and (b) do (...) those who represent actual time as dynamical, represent time in all possible worlds as dynamical—what we call insensitive dynamism—or do they represent time in all possible worlds as dynamical only conditional on the actual world in fact being dynamical—what we call sensitive dynamism and (c) do dynamists and non-dynamists deploy two different representations of time, or deploy the same representation, but disagree about what actually satisfies that representation? We found no evidence that the folk representation of time is sensitive, or that the folk representation of time is essentially dynamical in either sense, though we did find evidence of a shared representation, on which dynamical features are sufficient, but not necessary, for time. (shrink)

Part Three of Ordo VI of the Amsterdam edition of Erasmi opera omnia presents his Greek text and his Latin translation of St. Paul’s letters to the Romans, the Corinthians, the Galatians, the Ephesians, the Philippians, the Colossians and the Thessalonians.